# **CURRICULUM VITAE**

TITLE AND NAME: Bandaogo, Mahama Abdel Samir Sidbéwendé

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### **EDUCATION:**

# University of Washington, Seattle, WA

PhD Economics - 2016 M.A. Economics - 2012

<u>Dissertation:</u> "Essays on fiscal policy, monetary policy and currency unions: exploring the role of informality and labor mobility."

## University of Oregon, Eugene, OR

B.S. Mathematics and Economics, Departmental Honors - 2010

<u>Honors Thesis:</u> "A reassessment of the poverty level in Burkina Faso: implementation of a weakly relative poverty line." Under the supervision of Prof. Peter Lambert, University of Oregon.

### **FIELDS OF INTEREST:**

- Macroeconomics & Monetary Economics.
- International & Open Economy Macroeconomics.
- Growth and Development Economics.

**Research topics include:** Informality, optimal fiscal and monetary policy, economic growth and exchange rate, sudden stops, currency unions, quality data on the African economies.

## **RESEARCH PAPERS:**

# Fiscal and monetary policy in the presence of informality and the incentive to join a currency union.

How does economic activity outside of government control —informality—affect the conduct of fiscal and monetary policy? I first study this question in a New Keynesian, small open economy model and then collect data to conduct an empirical analysis. The model is assumed to feature informality in both goods and labor markets. A non-traded sector produces a non-taxed informal good. The traded sector produces a formal good and is subject to taxation, but it can hire workers using both formal and informal contracts. I show that the presence of informality decreases the optimal tax rate and increases macroeconomic volatility. Estimation of the marginal effect of the informal sector on the tax rate using a panel data supports this finding. Moreover, when the country cannot credibly pre-commit to the optimal policy, informality significantly increases the incentive to peg the currency. This result can help explain why many sub-Saharan African countries have plans to either expand existing currency unions or to form new ones.

# Unemployment, optimal monetary policy and labor mobility in a currency union.

How does migration within a currency union affect welfare across the union? I study this question in this paper with a New Keynesian, currency union model. The union consists of two economies whose economies are characterized by labor market frictions. One country member has a higher job-finding rate and a lower unemployment rate, compared to the other country, hence unemployed agents in the former have an incentive to relocate to the latter. I show that when firms have the ability to hire workers from abroad and when unemployed agents can relocate to a different country, the negative impact of asymmetric shocks are significantly reduced, improving welfare across the union on balance.

### **RESEARCH IN PROGRESS:**

### **Exit from sudden stops: a hazard model approach.** (With Yu-chin Chen)

Using a hazard-based duration model we analyze the main determinants of the duration of a sudden stop. The hazard model estimates the conditional probability of an exit from a period of sudden stop: given that the country experiences a sudden up until the end of last period, what is the probability that it exits the sudden stop today? We find strong evidence that a higher ratio of foreign exchange reserves to short term external debt and a higher global economic growth shorten sudden stop spells. We also find that exchange rate flexibility, as measured by the exchange rate regime, increases the duration sudden stops.

Economic growth and exchange volatility: a propensity score matching approach. African countries cost of borrowing: is there an African risk premium? The distributional consequences of optimal monetary policy in a small open economy.

EMPLOYMENT:
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Northeastern University, Seattle. Sept. 2015 - Present

Adjunct Faculty, Commerce and Economic Development Program

North Seattle College, Seattle WA. Sept. 2013 - Present

Adjunct Faculty, Economics Department

Seattle University, Seattle WA. April 2016 - Present

Adjunct Faculty, Albers School of Business & Economics

University of Washington, Seattle WA.

**Economics Department:** 

Pre-doctorate Teaching Associate Sept. 2012 – Aug. 2015 Teaching Assistant Sept. 2010 - June 2012

Seattle Public Utilities - Seattle, WA. July 2012 - August 2013

**Economics Intern** 

**University Housing - University of Oregon, Eugene, OR**Sept. 2007 - June 2010

Resident Assistant

#### **SOFTWARE SKILLS:**

• R, Stata, SOL, Matlab, LaTeX and Microsoft Office (Word, Excel).

### **LEADERSHIP, VOLUNTEER WORK & OTHER POSITIONS:**

**Botiminto, Seattle WA** (Non-Profit Organization)

Director and Founder Sept. 2016 - Present

Teaching and Learning Center - University of Oregon, Eugene, OR

Mathematics Tutor Sept. 2007 - June 2010

University of Oregon, Eugene, OR

Co-director of International Students Association

President of African Students Association

July 2009 - June 2010

Sept. 2009 - June 2010

**Big Brothers Big Sisters of Puget Sound - Seattle WA** 

Big Brother Nov. 2010 - Present