

Yun-Ling Jocelyn Wang

UW Economics Box 353330 Savery 305 University of Washington Seattle, WA 98195-3330
jocelynw@uw.edu | +1 (253) 310-3228

Education

UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON, SEATTLE, WA

- B.S. Economics and Applied Computational Mathematical Science – June 2010
- M.A. Economics – Fall 2012
- PhD Economics – Expected Graduation Date: June 2017

Field of Interest

- Fisheries Economics, Experimental Economics, and Applied Microeconomics

References

· Chris Anderson (Co-Chair)

Associate Professor, School of Aquatic and Fishery Sciences (SAFS) Department
University of Washington
cmand@uw.edu | +1 (206)543-1101

· Fahad Khalil (Co-Chair)

Chair and Castor Professor of Economics, Economics Department
University of Washington
khalil@uw.edu | +1(206)543-5836

· Michael Link

President and Senior Fisheries Biologist and Policy Analyst
LGL Alaska Research Associates, Inc.
MLink@lglalaska.com | +1(907)562-3339

Experiences

RESEARCH ASSISTANT – UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON (2012 SUMMER – 2015 WINTER)

- Analysis of alternative escapement goals for Bristol Bay Sockeye Salmon Commercial fishery with integrated biological and economics models [refer to the unpublished report for more details]

INDEPENDENT INSTRUCTOR – UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON

- Introduction to Microeconomics: Spring 2013, Winter 2015, Summer 2015
- Intermediate Microeconomics: Spring 2015

TEACHING ASSISTANT – UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON

- Introduction to Microeconomics: Winter 2012, Fall 2012, Winter 2013
- Economics of Fisheries and Oceans: Spring 2016

Job market paper

- **“Post-season Pricing as a Mechanism for Risk Sharing: Evidences from Laboratory Experiments on Bristol Bay Commercial Sockeye Salmon Ex-vessel Market”**, *Christopher Anderson and Jocelyn Wang*

Post-season pricing mechanism, where buyers determine prices paid to sellers after product delivery and realization of uncertainties, can be perceived as a mechanism which facilitates collusion. Post-season pricing essentially provides a channel for information sharing on price, which may incentivize buyers to maintain low price offers. However, we argue that post-season pricing allows processors to observe realized uncertainties prior to a price commitment. This allows buyers to transfer part of the risks to sellers and in return sellers obtain higher average prices. Price-at-landing, an alternative pricing mechanism, involves buyers and sellers determining prices prior to realization of uncertainties and product delivery. Treating price-at-landing mechanism as a benchmark, collusion would suggest that the order of the price levels between two pricing mechanisms remain the same regardless of whether there is a risk in the market. Risk-sharing would suggest a reverse in the order with an introduction of risk. We conduct controlled laboratory experiment using Bristol Bay sockeye salmon fishery as a case study. We find that prices offered by buyers are lower (higher) under post-season pricing relative to price-at-landing under certainty (uncertainty) condition. We also demonstrate the need for buyers to be competitive under post-season pricing to maintain future market product shares by comparing repeated interaction with one-shot post-season pricing.

Unpublished Report

- **Curry Cunningham, Jocelyn Wang, Ray Hilborn, Chris Anderson. And Michael Link. Analysis of Escapement Goals for Bristol Bay Sockeye Salmon taking into Account Biological and Economic Factors. March 2015.**

We used computer models to simulate the fishery and the individual salmon stocks on a daily basis under alternate harvest policies to understand differences in key variables such as catch, value of harvest to fishermen and processors, and the inter-annual variability in these. Computer models were constructed that mimic the Bay's sockeye stocks, management rules (when to open and close the fishery), harvesting and processing revenues, and the effects of various escapement levels on subsequent returns. The model was run for 100-year simulations, and these simulations were repeated 100 times for each escapement goal alternative to characterize differences among policies. We found that the escapement goals that are supposed to maximize yield without considering uncertainties actually produce lower average yields than the current escapement goals. A slightly increase in escapement does increase mean and variance of the catch. Mobile driftnet harvesting sector may be the only harvesting sector to benefit from such increase whereas less mobile driftnet and setnet harvesters may suffer.

Work in progress

- **“An Analytical Approach to Examine Post-season and Price-at-landing Mechanisms”**, *Jocelyn Wang*

I analyze price differential between post-season and price-at-landing mechanisms from an analytical stand point. I adopt Dastidar (1995) Bertrand oligopoly model with increasing marginal cost for the price-at-landing mechanism. Under symmetric repeated game Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) and certainty conditions, prices are either same or higher under price-at-landing. This supports my job market paper finding in which the price differential under certainty condition is negative from post-season to price at landing although insignificant. Under uncertainty condition, post season pricing yields prices that can either be lower or higher than price-at-landing depending on parameter values.

- **“Evaluating the Distributional Effects of the 48-hour Waiting Period: Determinants of Harvester District-transfer Behavior in the Bristol Bay Salmon Fishery**, *Christopher Anderson and Jocelyn Wang*

This research intends to address the impact of 48-hour waiting period policy in Bristol Bay commercial salmon fishery on the drift gillnet fishermen's strategic behaviors and how effective the policy is in accomplishing its policy objectives. There are two objectives that this policy is designed to achieve: improve competitiveness of the set net fishery against the drift gillnet fishery and prevent fishermen simultaneously moving into a district with better than expected salmon run. To evaluate the effectiveness of 48 hour waiting period policy in achieving its intended goals, we need to first identify how fishermen utilizes information which is publically available and their expectation on other fishermen's fishing decision to make their own fishing decision daily. Using the estimated parameters, we can then conduct policy analysis to test whether removal of the policy would result in congestion in a district and decrease in revenue received by the set net fishery.

Conference Presentations

- “Post-season Pricing as a Mechanism for Risk Sharing: Evidences from Laboratory Experiments on Bristol Bay Commercial Sockeye Salmon Ex-vessel Market” | International Institute of Fisheries Economics & Trade Biennial Conference, Aberdeen, United Kingdom | July 2016
- “The Value of Alternative Escapement Goal Policies: How Much Can Be Captured?” | North American Association of Fisheries Economists Biennial Forum, Ketchikan, Alaska (USA) | May 2015
- “Managing for Sustainable Yield and Risk: Optimal Escapement Goal Policies in Bristol Bay” | International Institute of Fisheries Economics & Trade Biennial Conference, Brisbane, Australia | July 2014

Relevant Skills

COMPUTER LANGUAGES

- Microsoft Office (Word, Excel, Powerpoints), Stata, R, Eview

WRITTEN AND SPOKEN LANGUAGES

- English (Fluent) and Mandarin Chinese (Native)