

# Nail Hassairi

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## EDUCATION

**University of Washington**, Seattle, WA

PhD, Economics, June 2017

MA, Economics, June 2013

**Charles University**, Prague, Czech Republic

BS, Economics 2010

## REFERENCES

Yoram Barzel  
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## RESEARCH INTERESTS

labor economics, experimental economics, applied microeconomics

## EXPERIENCE

**University of Washington, Seattle**

- Research Assistant, Childcare Quality and Early Learning Research (CQEL UW) **2016**
- Research Assistant, Human-Computer Interaction (CSE UW) **2013 - 2015**
- Research Assistant, mortgage ownership structure and screening quality (UW Econ) **2013**

**Amazon, Seattle**

- Research Assistant, Machine Learning Team **2013 - 2015**

**Charles University**

- Research Assistant, spatial economics of Czech municipalities **2010 2012**
- Research Assistant, effects of conflict on preference formation **2009**

## RESEARCH

**Effort, Productivity, Wage Premia, and Reservation Wages: A Field Test of the Efficiency Wage Theory (job market paper)** This paper tests the shirking and adverse selection models of efficiency wage theory by investigating the relationship between effort, wages, and reservation wages in an online labor market, using a field experiment. The experimental design controls for many of the confounders that plague other tests of the efficiency wage theory. Additionally, it allows for a clean identification of the shirking and adverse selection models individually, in order to see which one is driving the efficiency wage effect. The results suggest causal effect of wages on effort that is due to incentive not to shirk, as well as an effect that is due to the selection of more able workers. The selection effect is stronger than the incentive effect. There appears to be heterogeneity in the way workers respond to incentives with workers that aim for longer tenures responding more positively. Dynamic effects are also detected, according to which a given worker provides more effort the more of her tenure is still ahead of her.

**Only if You Pay Me More: Field Experiments Support Compensating Wage Differentials Theory (with Claus Pörtner)** Compensating wage differentials is Adam Smith's idea that wage differences equalize differences in job and worker characteristics. Other than risk of death, however, no job characteristics have consistently been found to affect wages, likely because of problems with self-selection and unobservable job characteristics. We run experiments in an online labor market, randomizing offered pay and job characteristics, thereby overcoming both problems. We find, as predicted by our model, that increasing job disamenities significantly reduces both likelihood of working and amount of work supplied. Correspondingly, the wage increases necessary to compensate workers for worse job disamenities are substantial, supporting the theory.

**Labor Supply Elasticities in a Low Friction Labor Market (with Claus Pörtner)** This paper estimates extensive and intensive margin labor supply elasticity using data from field experiments conducted in an online labor market. Contrary to prior analyses using micro data, we find that the intensive margin elasticities are more than twice the size of extensive margin elasticities and that both are substantial, even if conditioning on working. Furthermore, using data on all workers in the experiments whether they decide to work on our experiments or not, we find overall elasticities that range from 1.2 to 2.9, depending on experiment and specification. We argue that our results are consistent with the idea that off-line labor markets are characterized by frictions that lower elasticities and may reverse the ordering of extensive margin and intensive margin elasticities.

#### SKILLS

- Stata, R, SQL, Python, Linux, L<sup>A</sup>T<sub>E</sub>X
- Languages: English (fluent), Italian (intermediate), French (elementary), German (elementary), Czech (native speaker)

#### TEACHING

##### University of Washington

- Teaching Assistant, Introduction to Microeconomics, (Spr, Aut 2011, Winter 2012)
- Teaching Assistant, Introduction to Macroeconomics, (Spring 2012)
- Independent Instructor, Introduction to Microeconomics, (Aut 2012)

#### AWARDS AND FELLOWSHIPS

- Best Second Year PhD Program Paper Award, University of Washington, 2013
- Buechel First Year Fellowship Winter 2011
- Hall Fellowship Autumn 2010