

---

CONTACT INFORMATION	Department of Economics University of Washington Savery Hall, Box 353330 Seattle, WA 98195-3330	Phone: 1-(206)-397-6770 Email: <a href="mailto:mishita@uw.edu">mishita@uw.edu</a> Web: <a href="http://mishitamehra.com">mishitamehra.com</a>
RESEARCH INTERESTS	International Macroeconomics, Economics of Immigration, Macroeconomics	
EDUCATION	Ph.D. in Economics, University of Washington, Seattle  • Committee: Fabio Ghironi (chair), Federico Mandelman, Oksana Leukhina, and Quan Wen  M.A. in Economics, University of Washington, Seattle M.A. in Economics, Delhi School of Economics B.A. in Economics (First Class Honors), Delhi University	2013 - Present    2015 2011 2009
EXPERIENCE	Dissertation Intern, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta	Summer 2017
AWARDS	NBER Pre-Doctoral Fellowship in High Skill Immigration Graduate Teaching Assistantship, University of Washington Prof. K.A. Naqvi Memorial Scholarship, Delhi School of Economics Third Position, Delhi University (South Campus)	2017 - 18 2013 - 2017 2010 2008
RESEARCH	“Skilled Immigration, Firms, and Policy (Job Market Paper) “Skilled Immigration, Offshoring, and U.S. Immigration Policy,” (with Raghav Paul) “The Distortionary Impacts of U.S. Skilled Immigration Policy: A Search and Matching Framework”, Work in Progress	
POLICY REPORTS/ CHAPTERS	“Upgrading in the Indian garment industry: a study of three clusters” (with Saon Ray and Prithvijit Mukherjee), Asian Development Bank Economics Working Paper Series No. 43, April 2016. Available at SSRN: <a href="https://ssrn.com/abstract=2941857">https://ssrn.com/abstract=2941857</a>  “Normalizing India-Pakistan Trade” (with Taneja et al.), in <i>India Pakistan Trade: Strengthening Economic Relations</i> (pp. 13-45), Springer, August 2014  “India-Pakistan: Trade Perception Survey” (with Taneja et al.), in <i>India-Pakistan Trade: Strengthening Economic Relations</i> (pp. 71-126), Springer, August 2014	
TEACHING EXPERIENCE	Instructor, Intermediate Macroeconomics Teaching Assistant, Graduate Macroeconomics III Instructor, Introductory Macroeconomics Teaching Assistant, Introductory Macroeconomics Teaching Assistant, Introductory Microeconomics	Fall 2016, Spring 2017 Spring 2016 2015 - 16 2013 - 14 2013
CONFERENCE/ PRESENTATIONS	American Economic Association (AEA) Annual Meeting (Poster Session), Philadelphia Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta MTI Brownbag, Economics Department, University of Washington CSWEP Sessions at the WEAI meetings, Portland, Oregon	January 2018 (Scheduled) July 2017 December 2016 July 2016

Conference on Normalizing India Pakistan Trade Relations, New Delhi March 2013

OTHER  
EXPERIENCE Research Assistant, Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations, New Delhi 2012 - 2013  
Correspondent, The Economic Times newspaper, New Delhi 2011 - 2012  
Intern, Revenue Department, Ministry of Finance, India Summer 2010

OTHER  
SERVICE Reading Comprehension, Critical Thinking, Writing Skills Assessment (RTW) Exam Grader, University of Washington Fall 2014, Fall 2015, Winter 2017

OTHER  
INFORMATION Citizenship: Indian  
Technical Skills: Matlab, R, Stata

REFERENCES **Professor Fabio Ghironi**  
Department of Economics  
University of Washington, Seattle  
Email: ghiro@uw.edu

**Federico Mandelman**  
Research Economist and Associate  
Adviser  
Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta  
federico.mandelman@atl.frb.org

**Oksana Leukhina**  
Associate Professor  
Department of Economics  
McMaster University  
oksana.m.leukhina@gmail.com

ABSTRACTS **Skilled Immigration, Firms, and Policy**

This paper studies the macroeconomic general equilibrium effects of skilled immigration policy changes by explicitly taking into account the role of firm demand for foreign skilled labor. To this end, I develop a two-sector dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with monopolistically competitive firms and heterogeneous workers. Unlike most previous studies that view immigration as a supply-induced shock, the paper models skilled labor immigration as an endogenous response to an increase in firm labor demand in the receiving economy. The model is calibrated to mimic the U.S. economy with its current immigration policy: Firms face hiring costs and there is an occasionally binding cap on the foreign skilled workers that can be hired each period. The results indicate that a less restrictive skilled immigration policy via an immigration cap increase leads to heterogeneous effects on skilled and unskilled workers — unskilled domestic workers gain but skilled domestic workers lose. However, the magnitude of the welfare impacts depends on the state of the economy at the time of the cap change and also on the structure of the labor market (presence of search frictions). This paper also evaluates the welfare and efficiency gain from moving toward an alternate skilled immigration policy with a market-driven allocation of permits for hiring skilled foreign workers. Such a policy increases welfare and brings the economy's allocation closer to the social planner's first-best allocation.

## Skilled Immigration, Offshoring, and U.S. Immigration Policy

This paper studies the effect of skilled immigration policy changes on the offshore production by domestic firms. Empirical evidence suggests that skilled immigrants are often a substitute for workers hired offshore (Ottaviano et al. (2015)). On the one hand, firms may prefer to hire skilled immigrants directly in the domestic economy due to gains from proximity (Kerr and Kerr, 2015). However, domestic skilled immigration policy restrictions (cap on foreign workers) may prevent firms from hiring their desired number of skilled foreign workers locally. Therefore, firms have an incentive to incur costs and set up offshore facilities in a foreign country (or expand existing facilities). Motivated by this, I study the interaction between U.S. immigration policy changes and offshore activities using a two country Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium model. In the model, firms have an option to incur an additional cost and produce output using offshore skilled labor in case the binding cap on skilled immigrants prevents them from hiring their optimal number of skilled workers. Since the cost of setting up or expanding offshore production is higher than the cost of hiring immigrant workers locally, only the most productive domestic firms would be able to overcome frictions imposed by U.S. skilled immigration policies and gain access to a larger foreign skilled labor stock. A stricter skilled immigration policy increases the extensive and intensive margin of offshoring by domestic firms. This paper has important policy implications as it allows us to gain a deeper understanding of the interaction between immigration policy changes and the labor market outcomes of domestic workers. This is especially important since the main argument for a stricter skilled immigration policy is to mitigate the negative impact of skilled immigration on domestic skilled households.