

## **Qing Zhang**

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### **Education**

PhD, Economics, University of Washington, 2012 – Present, degree expected 6/2020

BA, Economics, Beijing Normal University, Beijing, China, 2006 - 2011

### **Field of Research**

Labor economics, Property rights/transaction cost economics

### **Research Papers**

“The Rationale of Marriage and the Impact of DNA Test on its Organization”, *with Yoram Barzel and Aurora Stephany*. **This is my Job Market Paper, and I did the modelling and the empirical work for it.**

We argue that the rationale for marriage is to provide paternity assurance to the man and enforcing the man's duties in the upbringing of children. Traditionally, the assurance of the men's paternity has been primarily attained by imposing constraints on wives' activities. For example, historically, married women had limited liberty to travel, limited access to the marketplace, and limited access to social events. At the same time, enforcing the man's obligations in the up-bringing of the children had been facilitated by having the two parties register their relationship at state or religious bodies. Our marriage hypothesis predicts that with the emergency of DNA paternity test, more children will be born to cohabiting partners, and the increase will be larger for women of lower standings than for those of higher standings. Our marriage hypothesis also predicts that with the emergence of DNA test, the gain from bearing children in marriage or in cohabitation has increased. As a result, we expect that more children will be born in marriage or to cohabiting partners, and fewer to single mothers. We use data from the National Survey of Family Growth to test our hypothesis. The preliminary results support our hypothesis.

“Single Mothers and Children Achievement: An Empirical Inquiry into the Tradeoff Between Support and Child Fitness in Marriage”, *with Aurora Stephany*

An implication of our marriage hypothesis is that women who *plan* to be single mothers will seek to have children with men of higher standings than they, while women who plan to marry in order to obtain support will marry men of the same standings as they. And we expect that children of the two groups of women will perform differently. We assess two groups of youths according to their mothers' status: women who chose to be single mothers (i.e., those were not married when they gave birth) and women who expected to obtain male support but became single mothers (i.e., those who were married when they gave birth but lost their husbands shortly thereafter). We then compare each youth to his or her own mother's school and income outcomes. Using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (1997), we find significant differences in both school and income outcomes between

the two groups of offspring. The hypothesis is confirmed, as the children of intentional single mothers outperform their mothers by a greater magnitude than do the children of unintentional single mothers perform relative to their mothers.

## **Technical Skills**

Statistical knowledge: Econometrics, Causal modelling

Data processing: R

Language: Chinese (native), English (fluent)

## **Working Experience**

Intern at the Financial Times, Beijing, China, 2/2012 - 5/2012

## **Teachings**

TA for Introductory Microeconomics (3 times),

Independent teaching of Introductory Microeconomics (8 times)

## **Presentations**

22nd Annual Conference of the Society for Institutional & Organizational Economics,  
HEC Montreal, June 2018

## **References**

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