Robert R. Richards Professor of Economics; Graduate Program Director
Fields of Interest
Biography
Ph.D., Economics, University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario, Canada, 1991
M.A., Economics, University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario, Canada, 1988
B.Sc. (Honors), Mathematics, Jilin University, Changchun, Jilin, China, 1985
CV (435.76 KB)Research
Selected Research
- Tan, Xu and Quan Wen. 2020. ``Information Acquisition and Voting with Heterogeneous Experts.'' RAND Journal of Economics, 51(4) :1063-1092.
- Xu Tan and Quan Wen (2020), “Information Acquisition and Voting with Heterogeneous Experts,” Rand Journal of Economics.
- Miguel Aramendia and Quan Wen (2020), "Myopic Perception in Repeated Games," Games and Economic Behavior.
- Yangguang Huang and Quan Wen (2019). Auction-lottery hybrid mechanisms: Structural model and empirical analysis. International Economic Review, 60, 355-385.
- “A Subsidized Vickrey Auction for Cost Sharing,” Jesse Schwartz and Quan Wen, Journal of Mathematical Economics (2018), 77, 32-38.
- Miguel Aramendia and Quan Wen (2014), "Justifiable Punishments in Repeated Games," Games and Economic Behavior 88, 16-28.
- Harold Houba and Quan Wen (2011), "Extreme Equilibria in the Negotiation Model with Different Time Preferences," Games and Economic Behavior 73 (2), 507-516.
- Sang-Chul Suh and Quan Wen (2009), "A Multi-agent Bilateral Bargaining Model with Endogenous Protocol," Economic Theory 40 (2), 203-26.
- Quan Wen (2002), "A Folk Theorem for Repeated Sequential Games." Review of Economic Studies 69 (2), 493-512.
- Lutz-Alexander Busch and Quan Wen (1995), "Perfect Equilibria in a Negotiation Model," Econometrica 63 (3), 545-65.
- Quan Wen (1994), "The 'Folk Theorem' for Repeated Games with Complete Information." Econometrica 62 (4), 949-54.
- Marco Mariotti and Quan Wen (2021), "A Non-Cooperative Foundation of the Competitive Divisions for Bads,” Journal of Economic Theory.